Use Cases

Situation. An early-stage life sciences platform company was chasing as many as ten possible markets, with an investor story diluted across too many directions to be fundable.

Task. Decide where to actually focus, and build an investor narrative that would survive diligence.

Action. We built a market-prioritization model scoring every market on attractiveness (size, growth, competitive intensity, regulatory burden) against fit with the platform (mid-plex need, low cost per sample, fast turnaround, ease of use), plotted against the competitive landscape. Markets fell away for concrete reasons, some for competitive intensity, others for insufficient size or regulatory burden, and we narrowed the field to three focus markets. Then we rebuilt the investor narrative around them: problem, solution, traction, ask, with use of proceeds tied to milestones.

Result. The company went from as many as ten markets to a focused three, a decision that played a major role in securing an $8M bridge round and now anchors the entire company strategy.

Situation. A commercial-stage life science company wanted to turn a high-complexity lab service into a kitted product, a launch that would open an entirely new revenue stream. But the program was chronically stuck. Timelines had already slipped by roughly eighteen months, no prior attempt had produced a workable plan, and no one owned it. The launch spanned manufacturing, supply chain, biology, informatics, engineering, and marketing, six functions with no ringleader to align them and no one on the team who had launched a product before.

Task. Take an ownerless, chronically delayed, cross-functional launch and get it to market.

Action. We were brought in to build the launch and drive it. We developed the entire plan from scratch, critical path, a RACI that finally put clear ownership on every workstream, countermeasures, and baselines, structured against a formal stage-gate process from concept through feasibility, development, pilot, and launch. Then we ran it: leading the core-team meetings and holding 1:1s with each workstream lead to keep six functions moving in step against the plan.

Result. The company launched two months after the plan was built, after eighteen months of slippage, in time for a major industry tradeshow. The kitted product opened a new revenue stream forecast at $10M in its first year alone.

Situation. An early-stage life sciences company was preparing to launch a new platform in one of the most crowded fields, against everyone from bead-based incumbents to NGS-scale discovery platforms.

Task. Map the landscape rigorously enough to define what the new platform actually needed to be.

Action. We built a full competitive analysis across more than a dozen platforms, spanning closest competitors, discovery and high-plex systems, and clinical IVD analyzers, with head-to-head battle cards, a positioning map, and objection handling. From that landscape we drilled into a focused audit of the three closest competitors, assessing their capabilities across hardware, software, and reagents against the platform.

Result. The comprehensive competitive analysis helped drive the product requirements for the new platform.

Situation. An international molecular diagnostics company acquired a validated breast-cancer polygenic risk score and set out to enter the US. The science was genuinely strong, multiple peer-reviewed validations, multi-ancestry data, a clean trademark, an early distribution deal. But as our assessment put it, what they had was a strong validation dossier attached to an unfinished commercial model.

Task. Determine whether the company could realistically build its own US market access, or whether a different path was required, before it spent years and serious capital finding out the hard way.

Action. We ran the service through PRIYA, our commercial-readiness and product-market-fit assessment. It found the plan was trying to be two businesses at once, a lab-channel play and a cash-pay concierge play, and that with no reimbursement and no guideline inclusion, the addressable market was structurally capped at cash-pay until a clinical-utility dataset existed. It also flagged a market model built on percentage assertion rather than channel arithmetic, an economic value case left undefined while a distribution partner was already selling, and no KOL or customer-support plan behind a test clinicians were already ordering.

PRIYA diagnosed the gaps. The strategy was ours. Building US market access alone meant funding a multi-year evidence-and-access effort at long odds, so we built the alternative and made the case for it: license the polygenic risk score to a diagnostics company that already owned the US sales force, payer contracts, and CLIA lab infrastructure, with named partner targets, a bridging marketing engine to create clinician demand in the meantime, and a phased roadmap running from evidence packaging through partner development to scale.

Result. We presented the analysis and the strategy to the company's chief executive, whose response was that it was exactly the right approach. The alternative on the table was a solo US market-access build that would have consumed years and low-seven-figure spend at low probability of securing reimbursement. What they had instead was a costed, evidence-based partnering path with named targets and a phased roadmap, produced before a dollar of that spend was committed.

Situation. An early-stage life sciences company had built its commercial strategy on a broad, multi-geography clinical ambition, without fully accounting for how sharply regulatory and market-access realities differ from one region to the next.

Task. Pressure-test that strategy against the actual global clinical landscape before the company committed resources behind it.

Action. We ran the platform through PRIYA, mapping the commercial plan against the regulatory pathways and market-access realities of each target geography. The analysis showed the strategy as written was heading for failure in key regions, anchored to clinical assumptions the local regulatory environment wouldn't support, and it pinpointed where the company genuinely had a path to market.

Result. The company refocused its commercial strategy in real time, steering effort toward the markets where it could win and away from the ones set up to fail. What would have been a slow, expensive misstep became a sharper, evidence-based plan it could execute with confidence.

Situation. A biomanufacturing software company had a genuinely strong product: analytical feedback that improves human execution on the manufacturing floor, cutting failed and deviated production runs that cost more than $700K each. The proof was already there, roughly $4M a year saved at one manufacturer, a 75%+ reduction in QC errors across two firms, a disciplined bottom-up market model with named, scored target accounts, and a provisional patent.

Task. Pressure-test whether the company was ready to take that proof to market and to investors.

Action. We put the product through PRIYA. Despite the strong proof, commercial coherence came back Mixed, and the reasons were instructive. For a product touching GMP batch data, the 21 CFR Part 11 and computer-system-validation posture rested on an untested assertion. The buying committee named a marketing leader as a decision-maker while omitting the IT and QA/validation personas who actually approve GMP software, the company was aiming at the wrong room. And the market-sizing TAM swung roughly 25x on a single soft per-site price. PRIYA laid out the fix sequence: define the real buyer, produce the validation and data-integrity package, stress-test the market-sizing anchor, and convert internal metrics into customer-grade evidence.

Result. We established a defined ideal customer profile with explicit disqualification criteria, letting the company focus marketing on higher-probability CDMO and pharma opportunities and screen out low-fit prospects earlier in the sales process. In the client's own words, the pitch came together "sharper on the edges of customer fit."

Situation. A commercial-stage genomics services company had a capable sales team but a transactional selling culture. Reps closed simpler deals but lacked the repeatable methods, coaching, and enablement to consistently win larger, more complex opportunities. There was no formal sales methodology, no structured onboarding, no centralized content, and prospecting was running well below what the targets required.

Task. Assess the sales organization end to end and build the management practices and enablement frameworks to lift both manager effectiveness and rep performance.

Action. We ran a Management 360 and enablement program across three connected modules. It started with diagnosis: 360-degree reviews of managers (superior, peers, subordinates, self), a digital survey of 32 reps, phone interviews with 12 more, and content and process audits. From that we delivered the building blocks, territory and account planning with gap analysis, SOPs and templates, and manager best-practice sessions, and we ranked a slate of initiatives on a feasibility-versus-importance matrix: a custom sales methodology, a structured onboarding program, a centralized content repository, and formalized prospecting expectations.

Result. The company adopted territory and account planning and moved into implementation on the prioritized roadmap, with the highest-leverage fixes clearly identified, most notably a prospecting gap the assessment quantified: reps generating three to five leads a week against a target of ten to fifteen. Phase 1 gave leadership an evidence-based picture of where sales performance was leaking and a sequenced plan to fix it, with Phase 2 scoped around methodology, enablement technology, and a formal performance-review process.